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The allocation of emission entitlements across countries is the single most controversial issue
in international climate policy. Extreme positions within the policy debate range from
entitlements based on current emission patterns (CEP) to equal-per-capita (EPC) allocations.
Convergence (COV) from an initial CEP allocation towards EPC emission rights represents a
reconciliation of the two. This paper maintains that the acceptability of alternative entitlement
schemes depends on their implications for economic welfare. Based on a dynamic multi-
sector, multi-region general equilibrium model of the world economy we do a comparative
economic assessment of the above allocation rules.
We find that - independent of emissions trading - CEP can be assessed as unacceptable
to the developing countries since it imposes high welfare losses on them. Concerning the EPC
scheme, the most outstanding result is that, unless coupled with emissions trading, it entails
global welfare costs several times higher than those encountered under the other entitlement
rules. The extreme dispersion of marginal abatement costs implied by the EPC arrangement
offers a large potential for cost reduction by means of international emissions trading. The
latter will cut global welfare costs by 80 percent and would provide a Pareto improvement
over the corresponding no-trade case. EPC cum emissions trading, however, induces a
pronounced dichotomy between the developing countries and the industrialized countries in
that the former experience welfare gains relative to the doing-nothing  case, whereas the latter
would must carry the burden not only of climate change mitigation but also of large-scale
global income redistribution. COV  cum emissions trading stands out for offering the
developing countries substantial incentives for participation in the international greenhouse
gas abatement effort without imposing excessive burdens on the industrialized countries. Thus
- among the arrangements examined - COV  cum emissions trading appears as the most
acceptable.
In addition to the policy perspective, a major methodological insight from our results
is that changes in the terms of trade play an important role in assessing the economic
implications of alternative frameworks for international greenhouse gas abatement. Terms-of-
trade effects may imply that a particular emission entitlement scheme places significant
welfare costs even on those countries that do not face binding emission constraints. Therefore,
the acceptability of alternative international carbon abatement arrangements cannot be
assessed at “face value”.Contraction of Global Carbon Emissions:
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Abstract
The allocation of emission entitlements across countries is the single most controversial issue
in international climate policy. Extreme positions within the policy debate range from
entitlements based on current emission patterns (CEP) to equal-per-capita (EPC) allocations.
Convergence (COV) from an initial CEP allocation towards EPC emission rights represents a
reconciliation of the two. This paper maintains that the acceptability of alternative entitlement
schemes depends on their implications for economic welfare and uses a dynamic multi-region
general equilibrium model for a comparative economic assessment of the above allocation
rules. We find welfare implications for the various regions to be strongly influenced by
changes in the terms of trade. Especially, regions may experience considerable welfare losses
even under entitlement schemes which impose no binding emission constraint on them.
Among the arrangements examined, COV cum emissions trading stands out for offering the
developing countries substantial incentives for participation in the international greenhouse
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1.  Introduction
In order to mitigate the expected climate change arising from the atmospheric
accumulation of CO2 and other trace gases, a significant contraction of global greenhouse gas
emissions is widely postulated. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has
stated that in order to avoid a substantial increase of the global mean temperature by the end
of the 21st century, global emissions will have to be reduced by up to one half by 2100
(UNEP 2001).
International policy agreements to achieve such reduction targets must - in the first
place - address one fundamental issue which has already dominated previous climate change
negotiations and which proved to be extremely difficult to solve: the allocation of emission
entitlements or likewise abatement duties across countries. A second, related issue is the
flexibility with which these duties can be fulfilled by the countries involved, for instance by
means of international emissions trading. Whether emission entitlements should be tradable or
not is also subject to controversy in the political arena.
1
Proposals on the allocation of emission entitlements can be grouped in terms of two
main focal principles (Grubb 1995): equal per capita allocation and allocation related to the
status quo. The equal per capita allocation corresponds to the justice principle of "equality of
resources" and is the fair division criteria most often cited in the literature (see Bertram 1992,
Kverndokk 1995). It is derived directly from egalitarianism, suggesting that all human beings
should be entitled to an equal share of the atmospheric resource. At the opposite end of the
spectrum, a strict status-quo allocation - proportionate to current emissions - has been
considered in the literature (see e.g. Young and Wolf 1992). According to this view, current
emissions would constitute a status-quo right established by past usage and custom.
These two principles mark the range of positions held by the players in international
climate diplomacy. Many developing countries have emphasized that acceptance of any
emission constraint can be expected only if emission rights are allocated on an equal-per-
capita basis (Rose et al. 1998). From the perspective of the industrialized countries, however,
equal per capita entitlements would imply a tremendous deviation from current emission
                                                        
1 Objections against international emissions trading range from moral considerations to pragmatic ones. Moral
arguments - which play a role in the policy debate although typically neglected from a purely economic point of
view - maintain that emissions trading allows countries “to buy themselves out” of their obligations. Pragmatic
aspects concern the certification, verification and monitoring of international emissions trading. Even though
diverging views on the role of flexibility played a role in the climate policy negotiations so far, it is essentially
the controversy about the allocation of abatement duties between industrialized and developing countries which
led to the recent withdrawal of the U.S. from the Kyoto Protocol.3
patterns and - if applied on short notice - induce huge adjustment costs in the countries with
currently high per capita emissions.
In view of the latter consideration, it is, therefore, reasonable to interpret the
egalitarian criterion in a long-term perspective, allowing for gradual adjustment from current
emission patterns towards a terminal point where future entitlements to emit will have
become proportional to population (convergence). The global emission budget in such a
scenario would have to be continuously reduced, in line with the climate protection
requirements mentioned above.
2
Convergence of emission entitlements appears to be a natural way of reconciling the
two extreme normative positions discussed above. It is essentially a mixed system which links
egalitarian and status-quo approaches by combining population and current emissions such
that the weighting accorded to population increases over time towards a purer per capita
allocation.
This paper maintains that irrespective of the comparative philosophical appeal of the
three fundamental approaches to emission entitlement, the prospects for a broader political
agreement on any one approach will depend on their economic implications in terms of the
magnitude and distribution of welfare costs across regions.
3 Assessment of these implications
is, however, a complex task, especially because the welfare costs of emission abatement
depend not only on the profile of emission entitlements but also on whether emission
entitlements are tradable or not.
In approaching this problem, we use a dynamic multi-region general equilibrium
model of the world economy to provide a comparative economic assessment of the emission
entitlement schemes outlined above. Each of these entitlement scenarios is examined for the
case with and without emissions trading among the regions.
A major methodological finding of the paper is that the welfare implications for the
various regions are strongly influenced by changes in the terms of trade. Because of this
influence, some regions may experience significant welfare losses even under entitlement
allocation rules which impose no binding emission constraint on them. In addition, terms of
trade effects may prevent that international emissions trading provides a Pareto improvement
relative to a no-trade regime. In view of such effects, it becomes obvious that alternative
                                                        
2 Formulations such as this have been discussed independently by Grubb and Sebenius (1992), Shue (1993) and
Welsch (1993). More recently, a similar proposal has been launched under the label “Contraction and
Convergence” (Global Commons Institute 1997).
3 Our welfare evaluation deliberately neglects the benefits from global warming mitigation, since benefit
estimates are highly uncertain and therefore can be expected to have little influence on the acceptability of
emission entitlement schemes.4
greenhouse gas abatement arrangements cannot be assessed at face “value”. We find that,
among the arrangements examined, the convergence approach coupled with emissions trading
has substantial comparative virtues by offering the developing countries incentives for
participation in the international greenhouse gas abatement effort without imposing excessive
burdens on the industrialized countries.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the definition of the stylized
policy frameworks to be examined. Section 3 outlines the characteristics and parameterization
of the model employed, and section 4 presents the numerical results. In section 5, we discuss
the results obtained and suggest policy conclusions.
2.  Design of Abatement Policies
We consider three emission entitlement rules each of which is combined with two
alternative assumptions on the tradability of emission rights. This yields six scenarios to be
examined.
A.  Alternative Distribution Rules for Emission Entitlements
In our policy simulations we compare three alternative assumptions on the entitlement
to carbon emissions:
 CEP Current  Emission Patterns: The global carbon resource is distributed across regions in
proportion to their current emissions.
EPC Equal Per Capita: The global carbon resource is distributed across regions in
proportion to their respective population.
COV Convergence:  As compared to CEP and EPC, the convergence scenario requires an
explicit consideration of the time horizon. Starting from the present, where current
emission patterns define the emission entitlement, COV warrants a gradual
convergence of emission entitlements over a specified time horizon towards equal-per-
capita rights (see section 2B below).
Scenarios CEP and EPC cover extreme positions in the equity debate while COV
represents a reconciliation of the two.5
B.  Definition of Global Emission Trajectory
Having stated the basic distribution rules for emission entitlements, we next define the
global carbon emission constraint over time. We refer to requests by the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) which postulates a reduction of global carbon emissions till
2100 by up to 50 percent below current levels (UNEP 2001). We take this to mean that
emissions till 2050 are to be reduced by roughly 25 percent and  that this target is to be
attained by gradual adjustment of global emissions over the period 2010 to 2050.
4
The global emission trajectory over the adjustment period is obtained by merging the
global reduction target for 2050 with the idea of convergence of per capita entitlements
towards the target year. This yields a gradual adjustment in both total emissions and in the
distribution of emission rights across countries.
In formal terms, the convergence idea warrants that the per capita emission rights of
country i in year t, zi(t), are a weighted average of business-as-usual per capita emissions in
2010 and the uniform per capita right z valid in 2050:
ii
40 (t 2010) (t 2010)
z (t) z (2010) z
40 40
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The total carbon limit CARBLIMi(t) for a country in a certain year is obtained by
multiplying the per capita emission right by the country’s population POPi(t) in that year
5:
) ( ) ( ) ( t POP t z t CARBLIM i i i ⋅ =
Adding the carbon limits across countries defines the global carbon limit over the time
horizon. We impose this global emission trajectory also on the scenarios CEP and EPC to
assure consistent comparison of alternative carbon entitlement rules. Under CEP, the given
global carbon budget at any point in time will be distributed across regions in proportion to
their 2010 emission levels whereas under EPC the carbon emissions will be allocated
proportional to the regions' projected population.
                                                        
4 The choice of 2010 as the starting year for global emission reduction reflects the idea that some time will be
needed to achieve such a substantial international agreement and that its provisions will not enter into force
instantaneously.
5 Of course, in implementing this formula, it is important to use population projections fixed ex ante, in order to
avoid incentives for population growth.6
C.  Flexibility
We distinguish between two abatement regimes which capture the extreme points of
where-flexibility
6 in international carbon abatement policy:
•  NTR: The carbon limits CARBLIM strictly apply at the country level. In other words,
countries are not allowed to buy or sell emission permits on international markets. All
emission reductions must take place domestically.
•  TRD:  Emission rights can be traded across borders. There are no restrictions to the
eligibility of trading partners and the magnitude of emission trade.
Throughout the simulations, we treat emission limitations as a resource constraint. We
then can interpret the shadow price on the emission constraint, i.e. the marginal abatement
costs, as the price of emission rights. In the TRD case, there will be an equalization of
marginal abatement costs across countries. Revenues from emission permits enter the national
accounts in each region.
3.  Summary of Analytical Framework
A.  Model Characteristics
This section provides a non-technical description of the intertemporal multi-sector,
multi-region model underlying our analysis. The detailed algebraic model formulation can be
downloaded under ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/div/contraction.pdf.
7 The model features 10
regions which are linked through bilateral trade flows. The economic structure of each region
consists of 4 production sectors (1 non-energy macro good sector and 3 fossil fuel sectors)
whose outputs are demanded by intermediate production, exports, investment and a
representative consumer. Table 1 gives an overview of the regional and sectoral aggregation.
Producers and representative consumers behave according to the competitive
paradigm, in the sense that they take market prices as given. Consumption and investment
decisions are based on rational point expectations of future prices. The representative agent
for each region maximizes lifetime utility from consumption which implicitly determines the
level of savings. Entrepreneurs choose investment in order to maximize the present value of
their firms. Rational expectations in a deterministic model confers clairvoyance on all
                                                        
6 An alternative form of flexibility, so-called when-flexibility is disregarded in this paper. When-flexibility
entails the banking and borrowing of carbon emission rights. A recent analysis of when-flexibility in greenhouse
gas abatement is provided by Stephan and Müller-Fürstenberger (2002).7
producers and consumers. While this assumption is strong, it seems to be the only consistent
approach in a deterministic model (see e.g. Manne and Richels 1992).
Table 1: Overview of sectors and regions
Sectors Regions
Energy AFR Sub-Saharan Africa
COA Coal CHN China
GAS Natural gas IDI India
OIL Crude oil LAM Latin America and the Caribbean
Non-Energy MEA Middle East and North Africa
ROI Non-energy macro good aggregate NAM North America (USA and
Canada)
PAO Pacific OECD (Japan, Australia,
New Zealand)
PAS Other Pacific Asia
REC Reforming economy countries
(newly independent states of the
former Soviet Union, Central and
Eastern Europe)
WEU Western Europe
In each region production of the non-energy macro good is captured by an aggregate
production function which characterizes technology through transformation possibilities on
the output side (between production for domestic and export markets) and substitution
possibilities on the input side (between alternative combinations of inputs). On the output side
production is split between goods produced for the domestic markets and goods produced for
the export market subject to a constant elasticity of transformation. On the input side capital,
labor and an energy aggregate of fossil fuels trade off with a constant elasticity of substitution
(CES). Production of the energy aggregate is described by a CES function which reflects
substitution possibilities for different fossil fuels (i.e., coal, gas, and oil). Fossil fuels are
produced from fuel-specific resources and the non-energy macro good subject to a CES
technology. The elasticities of substitution between the resource inputs and non-energy inputs
are calibrated to exogenous supply elasticities for each of the fossil fuels. The resource
supplies are calibrated to baseline estimates of fossil fuel production as given be the
IIASA/WEC Global Energy Perspectives (IIASA 1998).
                                                                                                                                                                                 
7 A disk including all the data and the programs for the replication of our results can be obtained from the
authors on request. The model is implemented in GAMS (Brooke et al. 1996) using MPSGE (Rutherford 1999)
and solved with PATH (Dirkse and Ferris 1995).8
The representative household in each region chooses to allocate lifetime income across
consumption in different time periods in order to maximize lifetime utility. In each period
households face the choice between current consumption and future consumption, which can
be purchased via savings. That is, consumption and the level of savings are endogenously
determined in each period by intertemporal utility maximization. The trade-off between
current consumption and savings is given by a constant intertemporal elasticity of
substitution. Households demand an aggregate consumption good, which is a CES composite
of the non-energy macro good and a household-specific energy aggregate.
Output is divided between consumption (incl. exports and intermediate demand) and
investment. The latter augments the depreciated capital stock in the next period. Investment
takes place as long as the marginal return on investment equals the marginal cost of capital
formation. The rates of return are determined by a uniform and endogenous world interest rate
such that the marginal productivity of a unit of investment and marginal utility of a unit of
consumption is equalized within and across countries.
Following Armington (1969), domestic, imported and exported varieties of the non-
energy goods are distinguished by origin. The Armington aggregation function provides a
constant elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported varieties for the non-energy
good for all buyers in the domestic market. With respect to trade in energy, fossil fuels from
different regions are treated as perfect substitutes, which implies that we use net trade data
with no cross-hauling. International capital flows reflect borrowing and lending at the world
interest rate, and are endogenous subject to an intertemporal balance of payments constraint:
there is no change in net indebtedness over the entire model horizon.
In each region there are backstop technologies for producing the industrial energy
aggregate and the household energy aggregate. The backstop technology defines the price for
a carbon free energy source in infinite supply (e.g. photovoltaic, fuel cells) and provides an
upper limit on the marginal costs of reducing carbon emissions. In each region the backstops
are produced employing the region’s non-energy macro good.
B.  Parameterization
Benchmark data are used to calibrate parameters of the functional forms from a given
set of quantities, prices and elasticities. Data from four different sources are combined to yield
a consistent benchmark data set:9
•  GTAP database (McDougall et al. 1998): GTAP includes detailed input-output tables for
45 regions and 50 production sectors as well as a world trade matrix with bilateral trade
flows for all sectors and regions.
•  IEA energy balances and energy prices/taxes (IEA 1996): IEA provides statistics on
physical energy flows and energy prices for industrial and household demands.
•  IIASA/WEC (IIASA 1998): IIASA/WEC makes projections on the future development of
world GDP and fossil fuel production for the 21st century differentiated by countries.
•  World Population Prospects (UN 1996): This source provides data on population growth
till 2050 for 194 countries plus summary groups.
We replace GTAP’s aggregate input-output monetary values for energy supply and
demand with physical energy flows and energy prices as given in IEA’s energy statistics. This
"bottom-up" calibration of energy demands and supplies yields sector-specific and energy-
specific CO2 coefficients. The advantage is that marginal abatement cost curves and hence the
cost evaluation of emission constraints are based on actual energy flows rather than aggregate
monetary data, which strengthens the credibility of the quantitative results.
Dynamic models in applied CGE analysis are often calibrated to a steady state growth
path in which all physical quantities grow at exogenous rates.
8 In our analysis we incorporate
the IIASA/WEC projections on non-uniform potential growth rates for GDP and fossil fuel
production across countries. The exogenous assumptions on fossil fuel production for our
business-as-usual (BAU) scenario imply a reference emission level for the world as a whole.
At the country level, the BAU emission trajectory determines the extent to which restrictions
of emission entitlements as prescribed by CEP, EPC, and COV bind economies in the future.
9
4.  Results
A.  Per Capita Endowments
Table 2 reports the per capita endowments over time for the three entitlement rules.
We first consider the actual emission profile as of 2000. It shows a tremendous dispersion,
ranging from 0.21 tons for Africa to 5.23 tons for North America.
In the scenario CEP, the regional per capita emission rights by 2050 range from 0.06
tons for Africa to 3.27 tons for North America, i.e. a North American’s emission rights exceed
                                                        
8 The virtue of the steady state calibration is that the amount of exogenous information which goes beyond the
explanatory scope of the model is kept at a minimum.10
those of an African by more than a factor of 50. This ratio for 2050 is more than twice the
current ratio. In general, the CEP rule implies a further increase of the already large inequities
of per capita emissions between industrialized and developing countries. The reason for this
result is the strong population growth projected for many of the developing countries,
especially in Africa and the Middle East.
Table 2: Per capita emission endowments by region for alternative entitlement rules (in tons
of carbon)
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Scenario CEP
AFR 0.21 0.19 0.14 0.11 0.08 0.06
CHN 0.72 0.78 0.66 0.56 0.47 0.39
IDI 0.22 0.23 0.19 0.16 0.13 0.10
LAM 0.58 0.61 0.50 0.41 0.33 0.27
MEA 0.55 0.51 0.37 0.27 0.20 0.15
NAM 5.23 5.84 5.11 4.43 3.84 3.27
PAO 2.87 3.32 3.05 2.78 2.47 2.16
PAS 0.68 0.71 0.60 0.50 0.41 0.34
REC 1.83 2.06 1.81 1.56 1.32 1.10
WEU 2.75 3.23 2.97 2.70 2.38 2.07
WORLD 1.07 1.11 0.91 0.75 0.60 0.48
Scenario EPC
All regions (WORLD) 1.07 1.11 0.91 0.75 0.60 0.48
Scenario COV
AFR 0.21 0.20 0.27 0.34 0.41 0.48
CHN 0.72 0.83 0.74 0.66 0.57 0.48
IDI 0.22 0.23 0.29 0.36 0.42 0.48
LAM 0.58 0.60 0.57 0.54 0.51 0.48
MEA 0.55 0.52 0.51 0.50 0.49 0.48
NAM 5.23 5.66 4.36 3.07 1.78 0.48
PAO 2.87 3.26 2.56 1.87 1.18 0.48
PAS 0.68 0.73 0.67 0.60 0.54 0.48
REC 1.83 2.10 1.70 1.29 0.89 0.48
WEU 2.75 3.15 2.48 1.82 1.15 0.48
WORLD 1.07 1.11 0.91 0.75 0.60 0.48
                                                                                                                                                                                 
9 See Böhringer et al. (2000) on the implications of alternative baseline assumptions for the magnitude and
distribution of abatement costs.11
The  EPC scenario entails that the current inequality in per capita emissions be
abolished within less than 10 years, i.e. by 2010. This scenario implies that the developing
regions get emission rights in excess of their current emissions, while industrialized countries
have to cut back their emissions strongly or else - under tradability - must buy substantial
amounts of emission rights. As the extreme example, an African by 2010 would have the right
to emit five times as much as she or he currently does whereas a North American would be
entitled to emit less than 20 percent of current emissions.
These figures illustrate the potential drawbacks of both the CEP and the EPC
scenarios. While the former places a huge long-term burden on the developing countries, the
latter confronts the industrialized countries with tremendous short-term adjustment
requirements. The COV rule avoids these drawbacks. In this scenario, all regions, except for
Africa and India, are facing decreasing per capita emission rights in the long term, but the
time path entails neither abrupt changes in the beginning nor huge inequalities towards the
end.
B.  Effective Cutback Requirements and Marginal Abatement Costs
The economic effects of carbon abatement depend on the effective cutback
requirements, i.e. emission reductions relative to the BAU path of emissions. The effective
cutback requirements by region are reported in Table 3. Negative entries indicate that the
respective emission constraint is not binding.
In the CEP scenario, all regions face binding carbon constraints from 2020 onwards.
The percentage cutback rates are rather uniform across regions because differences in
emission entitlements closely reflect the differences in BAU emissions. By 2050, cutback
rates are between 59 and 64 percent.
Under EPC, by contrast, cutback rates are much more dispersed. Some regions are not
facing binding constraints at all, but are entitled to emit more than they are expected to under
BAU. This is the case for AFR, IDI and MEA over the whole time horizon and for CHN,
LAM,  and PAS over the first few decades.
In the COV scenario, the cutback rates by 2050 are the same as in the EPC case, but
different at earlier dates. AFR, IDI and MEA again have abundant emission rights over the
entire time horizon, but the percentage of unused rights in the first decades is much smaller
than under EPC. For CHN, LAM and PAS no abundant rights occur at all.
At the global level, surplus carbon rights under EPC as well as COV imply that
emissions by 2050 are roughly 10 percent below the IPCC target (see Figure 1).12
Table 3: Effective cutback requirements (% from BAU)
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Scenario CEP
AFR - 23 39 51 61
CHN - 26 42 55 64
IDI - 23 39 51 60
LAM - 21 38 50 59
MEA - 22 40 52 61
N A M - 2 03 75 06 1
PAO - 21 38 52 63
PAS - 24 41 53 62
REC - 25 43 55 63
WEU - 21 37 50 61
Scenario EPC
AFR -469 -392 -331 -269 -215
C H N - 3 44 2 84 65 8
IDI -384 -269 -190 -130 -85
LAM -86 -47 -16 8 26
MEA -115 -89 -63 -44 -26
NAM 80 85 89 92 94
P A O 6 67 68 38 89 2
P A S - 5 3 - 1 41 43 24 6
R E C 4 76 37 38 08 4
W E U 6 57 58 28 79 1
Scenario COV
AFR - -44 -95 -151 -215
CHN - 22 37 49 58
IDI - -18 -38 -59 -85
L A M - 8 1 62 22 6
MEA - -5 -9 -17 -26
N A M - 3 05 57 69 4
PAO - 33 58 77 92
PAS - 17 30 39 46
REC - 31 54 70 84
WEU - 32 57 75 91
The occurrence of unused emission rights under the EPC scheme and, to a lesser
extent, under the COV scheme is likely to increase the global economic adjustment costs as
compared to the CEP scheme, unless emission rights are internationally tradable (i.e. surplus13
emission rights will be sold). Conversely, the economic benefit from tradability can be
expected to be more pronounced under COV and, particularly, under EPC than under CEP.
We will return to this logic below.
Figure 1 visualizes the global carbon trajectories for business-as-usual (BAU) vis-à-vis
the overall carbon entitlements (CARBLIM) and the actual emission path for the no-trade
case under scenarios CEP,  EPC and COV. Under BAU, global emissions increase from
roughly 6 Gt carbon in 2000 to 11.5 Gt carbon in 2050. This BAU trajectory is in line with the
IIASA/WEC A1-scenario (IIASA 1998). By 2050, the global carbon limit of 4.4 Gt as
suggested by the IPCC is more than 60 percent below BAU emissions which makes clear the
dramatic adjustment requirements towards less carbon-intensive production and consumption
patterns. For CEP, there are no surplus emission rights in the no-trade case. The CEP
trajectory, therefore, coincides with the CARBLIM trajectory. As explained above, emissions
under COV and EPC may fall short of the overall CARBLIM entitlements to the extent that
several regions do not face a binding carbon constraint.
Figure 1: Carbon emission trajectories
At the regional level, the effective cutback requirements constitute a key determinant
for the magnitude of marginal abatement costs in the no-trade case (NTR). The latter, in turn,
determines which countries will be sellers or buyers of emission rights when emission rights
can be traded across regions (TRD): Countries whose marginal abatement costs under NTR
are below the global carbon price (labeled WORLD in Figures 2-4 below) will sell emission
rights and abate more emissions. Conversely, countries whose marginal abatement costs are
above the global price will buy emission rights and abate less emissions.
The marginal abatement costs under the various emission entitlement schemes are









































independent of the specific entitlement scheme, the regional marginal abatement costs under
NTR and, hence, the distribution of buyers and sellers, if trade got implemented, is much
influenced by the entitlement rule.
In the CEP case, the dispersion of marginal abatement costs across regions is
relatively moderate, ranging from 330 $US to 655 $US by 2050. AFR, CHN, IDI and REC
have costs below the global carbon price and, therefore, will sell emission rights to the other
regions, i.e. LAM, MEA NAM, PAO, PAS, and WEU. The relatively narrow range of
marginal abatement costs across regions under CEP explains why emissions trading has rather
small effects: The group of permit buyers only emit 4 percent more than they would under
NTR whereas the group of permit sellers just emit 6 percent less as compared to the NTR case.
In the EPC scenario, marginal abatement costs by 2050 range from 0 $US up to 1600
$US. Industrialized countries (REC and OECD regions NAM, WEU, PAO) face relatively
high effective abatement requirements and, therefore, have high marginal abatement costs. On
the other hand, EPC imposes rather modest abatement requirements on CHN, LAM, and PAS
which translates into relatively low marginal abatement costs rendering these regions to
permit sellers in the TRD case. The regions AFR, IDI and MEA - not facing any binding
constraint over the whole time horizon - have zero abatement costs and will also be sellers.
Emissions trading under EPC induces large changes in the regional pattern of emissions
compared to purely domestic abatement. While the group of permit buyers increase emissions
by more than the double of their aggregate NTR emission level, the group of sellers only emit
roughly 70 percent of their NTR emissions. It is important to note that the large increase of
emissions within buyer regions is not only accommodated by additional reduction efforts on
behalf of the seller regions but also by the use of previous surplus emissions in regions AFR,
IDI, and MEA (as well as regions CHN, LAM, and PAS within the first few decades).
The same range of marginal abatement costs by 2050 and the same buyer-seller
configuration as in the EPC scenario arises in the COV scenario. The implications of
emissions trading on the regional reallocation of emissions are, however, significantly less
pronounced than in the EPC case: The possibility to buy cheaper abatement abroad makes the
group of permit buyers emit 1.3 as much as they would under NTR whereas the group of
permit sellers decreases emissions to roughly 80 percent of their NTR emission level. The
reason for the differences between EPC and COV becomes obvious from Figures 3 and 4.
While marginal abatement costs across regions coincide towards 2050 for both
scenarios they differ a lot in the preceding decades. The regional dispersion is much more
distinct under EPC than under COV providing more scope for international emissions trading.15
Section 4C below will confirm the economic intuition that the magnitude of changes in
regional emissions induced by emissions trading is a natural indicator for the achieved
economic benefits from where-flexibility. The larger these changes are, the higher the
potential welfare gains from emissions trading.
Figure 2a: Marginal abatement costs under NTR below global TRD permit price (WORLD)
for entitlement scheme CEP (seller regions)
Figure 2b: Marginal abatement costs under NTR above global TRD permit price (WORLD)

















































































































Figure 3a: Marginal abatement costs under NTR above global TRD permit price (WORLD)
for entitlement scheme EPC (seller regions)
Figure 3b: Marginal abatement costs under NTR below global TRD permit price (WORLD)
for entitlement scheme EPC (buyer regions)














































































































Figure 4a: Marginal abatement costs under NTR above global TRD permit price (WORLD)
for entitlement scheme COV (seller regions)
Figure 4b: Marginal abatement costs under NTR above global TRD permit price (WORLD)
for entitlement scheme COV (buyer regions)














































































































C.  Welfare Effects
It is the view taken in this paper that the acceptability of alternative permit allocation
schemes depends on their implications for economic welfare (see footnote 3). We measure
welfare changes by the Hicksian equivalent variation (HEV) in lifetime income discounted to
the year 2000. The welfare changes that arise from carbon abatement under the various
emission entitlement schemes are reported in Table 4 for the NTR and TRD case.
Table 4: HEV in lifetime income (% change from BAU ) – NTR versus TRD
Scenario CEP Scenario EPC Scenario COV
NTR TRD NTR TRD NTR TRD
AFR -2,26 -2,09 -2.73 20.72 -1.74 14.24
CHN -2,9 -2,08 -2.44 0.23 -2.35 -0.74
IDI -1,75 -1,71 0.23 21.56 0.16 15.15
LAM -1,21 -1,17 -1.56 0.98 -0.9 0.3
MEA -2,28 -2,02 -4.2 3.23 -2.6 2.03
NAM -0,8 -0,83 -6.71 -2.89 -2.64 -2.16
PAO -0,35 -0,4 -2.51 -1.19 -1.17 -0.96
PAS -0,5 -0,67 -0.12 0.64 -0.04 0.17
REC -3,3 -2,92 -13.84 -9.06 -7.82 -6.97
WEU -0,37 -0,40 -3.05 -1.37 -1.34 -1.1
WORLD -0,85 -0,83 -3.99 -0.77 -1.82 -0.75
Before starting the interpretation of results, it is useful to consider the factors which
determine the magnitude of welfare changes in a particular region. A major determinant of a
region's abatement costs and ensuing welfare losses is its effective cutback requirement.
Larger reduction in carbon emissions as a percentage of BAU emissions leads to larger
abatement costs. However, emission abatement in large open economies will not only affect
the allocation of domestic resources but also change international market prices. The change
in international prices implies an indirect secondary burden or benefit for all countries which
can significantly alter the primary economic implications of the domestic abatement policy.
10
Depending on its initial trade patterns a region will gain or lose from these international
spillovers, i. e. changes in its terms of trade.
With respect to carbon abatement and our sectoral disaggregation, it is useful to
distinguish spillovers from (a) fossil fuel markets: A larger cutback in global fossil fuel
                                                        
10 See Böhringer and Rutherford (2001) for a decomposition procedure of primary and secondary effects.19
consumption depresses the international prices of fossil fuels
11, and (b) non-energy markets:
Due to product heterogeneity associated with the Armington assumption for non-energy
macro good trade, countries are able to pass on an increase in production costs to other
countries. Whether a country will experience a terms-of-trade loss or gain on the macro good
markets depends on its initial trade shares and elasticities (of export supply and import
demand) as well as differences in the cost changes of macro good production induced by the
abatement scenario.
Terms-of-trade effects explain why a country can experience a welfare loss even if it
does not face a binding emission constraint, as is the case for some countries in our EPC and
COV scenarios. As it will be seen, they also can influence considerably the primary benefits
from international emissions trading.
In the CEP scenario without emissions trading, all countries face a binding emission
constraint and experience a loss in welfare which ranges from roughly 1/3 percent for WEU
and PAO to more than 3 percent for REC. Differences in welfare losses not only depend on
differences in the cutback requirements as reported in Table 3 but also on implied terms-of-
trade effects. On a worldwide scale, the welfare loss amounts to 0.85 percent. Under TRD, the
global welfare loss remains more or less unchanged (0.83 percent): Since the dispersion of
abatement costs is not very large under the CEP scheme, the overall benefits from lower
abatement costs arising under TRD are relatively small. Nevertheless, countries with large
losses under NTR, i.e. REC and CHN, now fare significantly better. On the other hand, the
welfare losses of PAO, WEU, NAM, and, particularly, PAS get enhanced which indicates that
emissions trading does not produce a Pareto improvement over NTR for the CEP scenario.
The result that emissions trading does not lead to a Pareto improvement is a clear
instance of terms-of-trade effects: Although it is known that - in the absence of second-best
effects - emissions trading must improve global efficiency, there is no guarantee - a priori -
that every region will benefit from emissions trading. The reason behind this ambiguity are
changes in the terms of trade which - contrary to the wide-spread partial equilibrium approach
in environmental policy analysis - are taken into account in our general equilibrium
framework.
12 In the CEP scenario under TRD, portions of the abatement burden are shifted to
                                                        
11 Obviously, a region which imports fossil fuels will benefit from the contraction of world fuel consumption
whereas a country which exports fossil fuels will suffer.
12 In terms of primary effects (i. e. without induced changes in international prices) all countries will benefit
from carbon trade. Secondary terms-of-trade effects, however, could offset or enhance the primary benefit from
trading carbon across domestic borders. Obviously, the prospects that the unambiguous primary gains from
emissions trading dominate the ambiguous secondary terms-of-trade effects depend on the initial permit
allocation. The more countries deviate in marginal abatement costs for the NTR case, the higher are the global
efficiency gains and - ceteris paribus - the associated gains at the country level.20
countries which are major suppliers of import goods for PAS, PAO, NAM and WEU. The
import prices of the latter countries’ increase. This more than offsets their primary benefit
from emissions trading due to reduced direct abatement costs.
The welfare effects are much different when we consider the EPC scheme. The main
finding is that, in the absence of emissions trading, the global welfare cost is higher than that
under CEP by almost a factor of five. This is the result of two partial effects. First, even
though the global carbon cap is the same as under CEP, the respective region-specific cap is
not binding for some of the developing countries. Consequently, the effective global carbon
emissions are lower under EPC than under CEP, and the global economy faces a stronger
adjustment requirement. Second, cutback rates under EPC are high for the industrialized
regions, even in the short term, requiring large structural adjustments. This implies very high
costs for the industrialized world as compared to the CEP scheme where emission
entitlements deviate much less from the BAU emission requirements.
A striking insight is that AFR and MEA, although not facing binding emission
constraints over the entire time span, experience significant welfare losses which even
succeed their adjustment costs in the apparently more restrictive CEP case. The reason is
again to be found in terms-of-trade effects: The imports of these countries become more
expensive because of high abatement costs in the supplier countries; in addition, reduced
import demand by the industrialized world, whose economic activity and income drops
substantially, exerts a downward pressure on the prices of exports from AFR and MEA (in
particular, revenues from fossil fuel exports decline). IDI, on the other hand, perceives terms-
of-trade gains, mainly due to reduced expenditure for fossil fuel imports.
Given the large divergence of marginal abatement costs across countries under the
EPC scheme, emissions trading offers huge benefits. When moving from NTR to TRD, the
global welfare loss drops from almost 4 percent to 0.77 percent.
13 In addition, emissions
trading is Pareto improving under the EPC scheme. As EPC entails large cross-country
differences in marginal abatement costs, the primary efficiency gains from emissions trading
are high enough to more than outweigh potentially negative terms-of-trade effects. In
addition, emissions trading now implies that all of the developing regions (including CHN)
actually  gain from climate change mitigation, i.e. they improve their economic welfare
considerably beyond BAU levels.
14 For OECD regions (NAM, WEU and PAO) and the
                                                        
13 Note that the global welfare loss for emissions trading under EPC as well as under COV is now smaller than
under CEP due to income effects incorporated in the general equilibrium framework.
14 Note that some of these regions do not exploit their carbon budget to the full extent under NTR. Their
(shadow) price of emission rights increases dramatically from zero in the NTR case to the world market permit21
reforming economy countries (REC) international emissions trading reduces adjustment costs
but still leaves them with significant welfare losses. In fact, the losses of industrialized
countries for EPC under TRD are much higher than those for CEP under NTR.
Considering the COV entitlement scheme under NTR, we find the global welfare loss
to be much more moderate than under the more extreme EPC allocation but still more than
the double of the CEP value. The welfare implications for IDI, MEA and AFR again reveal
the importance of international spillovers. Although these regions do not have to undertake
domestic abatement, they are affected by abatement action in other countries through changes
in international market prices. While IDI slightly gains from international spillovers, MEA
and AFR suffer from abatement elsewhere. As under EPC, the regions REC and NAM again
have the strongest losses in welfare, but these losses are now much lower because of less
stringent effective cutback requirements.
If the COV entitlement scheme is combined with emissions trading, we find that the
global welfare loss is reduced by half. Emissions trading is again universally beneficial as
compared to the NTR case, which means that under COV the primary efficiency gains from
emissions trading are still high enough to more than outweigh negative terms-of-trade effects
for individual regions. Similar to emissions trading under the EPC entitlement scheme, the
developing regions (except for CHN) improve their economic welfare beyond BAU levels
whereas CHN and the industrialized world (in particular, REC and NAM) still face significant
welfare losses.
5. Discussion and Conclusions
In assessing our simulation results, it can be concluded that CEP without where-
flexibility imposes particularly high welfare losses on REC and on the low developed regions
AFR, CHN, IDI and MEA. Emissions trading offers only very limited potential for alleviating
their burdens. In addition, emissions trading is in this case not universally (Pareto) superior to
a no-trade regime and may therefore be rejected by several regions. Overall, CEP can, thus,
be assessed as unacceptable to the developing countries independent of the degree of where-
flexibility.
Concerning the EPC scheme, the most outstanding result is that, unless coupled with
emissions trading, it entails global welfare costs several times higher than those encountered
under the other entitlement rules. The extreme dispersion of marginal abatement costs implied
by the EPC arrangement offers a large potential for cost reduction by means of international
                                                                                                                                                                                 
price under TRD. In other words: Their abundant emission rights under NTR become a valuable international22
emissions trading. The latter will cut global welfare costs by 80 percent and would provide a
Pareto improvement over the corresponding no-trade case. EPC cum emissions trading,
however, induces a pronounced dichotomy between the developing countries (including
CHN) and the industrialized countries in that the former experience welfare gains relative to
the doing-nothing (BAU) case, whereas the latter would must carry the burden not only of
climate change mitigation but also of large-scale global income redistribution.
In the COV scenario, it is still true that most developing countries experience a welfare
gain relative to BAU if emission entitlements are tradable, but the net transfers involved are
much smaller. Emissions trading entails a reduction in global welfare costs by more than
half
15 and is universally superior to the no-trade case. The chief virtue of the COV  cum
emissions trading arrangement is that it offers the developing countries a substantial incentive
for participation in the international climate change mitigation effort. By contrast, CEP entails
a further reduction of the already low income of the developing countries (including CHN).
EPC, on the other hand, either implies - in the no-trade case - tremendous global inefficiency,
or huge levels of trade in emission rights with associated very large "North-South" transfers.
The main problem with COV is the large welfare loss for REC due to the specific combination
of restrictive emission entitlements and adverse terms-of-trade effects from fossil fuel
markets, which would likely warrant some assistance from the other industrialized countries.
In addition to the policy perspective, a major methodological insight from our results
is that changes in the terms of trade play an important role in assessing the economic
implications of alternative frameworks for international greenhouse gas abatement. Terms-of-
trade effects may imply that a particular emission entitlement scheme places significant
welfare costs even on those countries that do not face binding emission constraints. Therefore,
the acceptability of alternative international carbon abatement arrangements cannot be
assessed at “face value”.
                                                                                                                                                                                 
resource which provides them with substantial additional net income.
15 It should be recalled, however, that part of the cost reduction arises because under COV the global carbon
budget is partly unused in the absence of emissions trading. This qualification concerning the virtues of
emissions trading applies a fortiori in the EPC case. We maintain, however, that the acceptability of carbon
abatement arrangements rests basically on their economic implications, unless the predefined global carbon
constraint is violated.23
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